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Mark Cammack
Between 1999 and 2002, the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis 
Permusyaratan Rakyat, MPR) approved four rounds of amendments to the Indonesian 
Constitution. Taken together, the additions to the constitution more than tripled the 
length of the original text. Among the most important changes contained in the post- 
Suharto amendments are the establishment of procedures for the direct election of the 
president, limitation of presidential tenure to two five-year terms, transfer of primary 
legislative functions from the executive to the legislature (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, 
DPR), creation of a constitutional court with the power to review the constitutionality 
of legislation, transfer of significant governmental powers from the center to local 
institutions, and the addition of a broad set of individual rights.1
1 For a discussion of these developments, see Tim Lindsey, "Indonesia: Devaluing Asian Values, Rewriting 
the Rule of Law," in Asian Discourses of Rule of Law: Theories and Implementation of Rule of Law in Twelve 
Asian Countries, France, and the US, ed. Randall Peerenboom (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 
pp. 286-323.
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The post-Suharto constitutional reforms took the form of amendments to the 
constitution of 1945. The authors of those amendments, however, could as easily have 
chosen to scrap the existing text and start fresh. The reformers retained the title and 
much of the language of Indonesia's first constitution, but the changes they made 
amounted to a repudiation of its essential philosophy and spirit. A principal objective 
of the post-Suharto constitutional restructuring was to prevent the rise of another 
repressive and open-ended dictatorial presidency. To achieve that objective the 
reformers drew clear boundaries between executive and legislative powers, created 
new centers of state power in local governments, and established mechanisms to avoid 
concentration of government power in any single institution.
The Leiden Legacy
The two books discussed here both speak to the significance of those constitution­
building developments, albeit from very different starting points. Peter Burns's book 
addresses debates over legal policy for the Indies occurring in Holland during the early 
decades of the twentieth century. In particular Burns examines efforts by scholars 
associated with Leiden University to make Indonesian custom, or adat, the basis for 
colonial law. As indicated by his title, however, Burns is not so much interested in the 
debates themselves as in the consequences of those debates for thinking about law and 
the state in the independent republic. He shows that while the Leiden group failed in 
its effort to create an Indies legal system based on custom, their ideas became the 
ideological basis for Indonesian nationalism and have had a lasting effect on 
Indonesian legal and constitutional thought.
The book is divided into two parts. Section I—"Making the Myth"—details the 
development and substance of the theory of “adatrecht" and documents the eventual 
triumph of the doctrine in the 1920s and 1930s. Section II—"Dismantling the Myth"— 
exposes the European origins of the adatrecht doctrine, demonstrates the flaws and 
distortions of its essentializing methodology, and reveals the enduring and unintended 
consequences of adatrecht theory for Indonesian ideas about law.
The central figure in both the adatrecht debates and Burns's book is Cornelis van 
Vollenhoven. In 1901 van Vollenhoven accepted an academic appointment in colonial 
law and administration at Leiden University. Over the next thirty years, until his death 
in 1933, van Vollenhoven accumulated a following of Dutch and Indonesian disciples 
who advocated making adat the basis for Indonesian law. The Leiden School was 
opposed in its promotion of adat by a group of scholars identified with Utrecht 
University; the opposition favored a legal system for the Indies based on European 
models.
Burns illustrates the assumptions and methods of adatrecht theory and gives a 
flavor of the polemics between Leiden and Utrecht with a discussion of the debates 
over a proposed revision to Indies land law. A 1918 proposal to amend the 
Regeeringsreglement—the government regulation that had served as the basic law for 
the Indies since the middle of the previous century—would have added language 
stating that "All land for which no other person can show ownership is Royal Domain 
land." This "domain doctrine," which had served as the legal foundation for the 
nineteenth-century cultivation system, was based on a crude legal construct according
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to which the Dutch monarch had acquired ownership of all unoccupied Indies lands 
through either conquest or treaty.
Van Vollenhoven ridiculed the domain theory as a symptom of its authors' 
"wretched attachment to European terminology." The "code-book jurists" who 
conceived the doctrine, he wrote, "do not know about ... and certainly will not 
recognize any system other than the Justinian and the Dutch-Napoleonic." Trapped in 
the categories of Continental European legal thought, they could only ask themselves: 
"Who here is the owner of this patch of undeveloped land?" Their answer: "'No one 
owns it,' whereupon the government declared, 'then I proclaim myself as owner and 
this patch as government domain.'" (18-19)
Contrary to the domain theory's premises, the Indies was not, van Vollenhoven 
wrote, "constitutionally 'barren and empty'" prior to Dutch contact; the region was 
"brimful with institutions of government and authority." (48) Among the more 
important indigenous legal institutions, and the one directly relevant to the proposed 
revision of the agrarian law, was the "right of allocation," which endowed the 
community with both rights and obligations over certain "virgin" lands. Members of 
the community could cultivate, settle, or garner from lands within its allocation area, 
and the community was entitled to compensation for use of its land by outsiders. 
Offenses committed within a community's lands imposed obligations on the 
community. Most importantly, lands subject to community rights of allocation were 
absolutely and permanently inalienable. Van Vollenhoven argued that the domain 
doctrine, which denied the existence of community rights over unoccupied lands, was 
descriptively mistaken, misguided as a matter of policy, and morally unpardonable.
The Domain Declaration with all the necessary attendant statutory paraphernalia 
might indeed be imposed from above. It would strike no root, however, being so 
thoroughly out of its depth, over alien ground. Imposition would, in any case, be 
the act of an autocrat. (40-41)
Van Vollenhoven's identification of law with custom is based on the premise that 
all law must find its source and authority in the values of the people. Law is thus 
fundamentally an empirical phenomenon, but its quasi-metaphysical essence is not 
directly manifest. The beliefs, values, or "thought-world" that comprise the spirit of 
law are discernible, however, in the ordered behavior or custom of a particular people. 
The task of technical jurisprudence is one of discovery and explication—to identify and 
articulate the legal principles that are immanent in the consciousness of the 
community.
The evident diversity of human customs excludes the possibility of identifying 
laws having universal validity. The multiplicity of actually existing cultures dictates 
that the law of each community will be peculiar to that community. As it happens, 
however, the Southeast Asian region is characterized by substantial similarity. Despite 
van Vollenhoven's emphasis on the variety of local customary practice, he discerned "a 
single basic Ur-adat common to all regions of the Indonesian culture area."2 (14) One 
institution around which he found a striking level of agreement is the right of
2 One of the more questionable products of the Leiden School's otherwise impressive 
ethnographic accomplishments was the division of the Indies into 19 precisely defined 
adat regions.
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allocation. The rights and restrictions relating to community lands were, according to 
van Vollenhoven, "as uniform in tenor and content as regulations from military 
commanders, dispatched from one centre." (24) The fact that the right of allocation was 
found to be pervasive across the archipelago was a crucial plank in van Vollenhoven's 
case against legal recognition of the domain doctrine. More importantly, the notion 
that island Southeast Asia comprises a distinct cultural and legal unity is central to 
Burns's argument about the enduring significance of van Vollenhoven's work.
Van Vollenhoven's arguments against the domain doctrine were successful in 
preventing its adoption as the basis for Indies agrarian law. The abandonment of the 
domain theory did not, however, settle the larger question concerning the proper 
foundation of colonial legal policy. Leiden naturally favored a plural legal system 
based on adat. Scholars identified with Utrecht advocated unification of Indies law 
through implementation of a comprehensive European-style code. A French-inspired 
civil code had been promulgated in the Netherlands in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, and the Dutch code had been given partial application in the colonies under 
the policy of "concordance." Among the advantages claimed for codification was 
greater legal certainty, which in turn was believed to promote the goals of economic 
development and modernization. Van Vollenhoven based his opposition to 
codification on both practical grounds—that it served Dutch commercial interests at 
the expense of native welfare—and out of an ideological conviction that an alien law 
not anchored in local cultural sensibilities would prove a dead letter.
The advocates of adatrecht ultimately prevailed. Legal unification was abandoned, 
and by the late 1920s the views of Leiden had become formal colonial policy. Burns 
dates the shift in policy from 1927 or 1928. But the most significant change associated 
with adoption of the new policy was the initiation of an investigation into Indies land- 
tenure practice. Apart from the fact that colonial administrators may have become 
somewhat better informed on matters of indigenous custom, legal practice on the 
ground proceeded pretty much as before.
The Leiden-Utrecht debates and the eventual triumph of adat after 1925 constitute 
the first four chapters of the book. (Chapter 2 digresses from the main story line for an 
exposition of the history of European legal philosophy to serve as background for the 
debates of the early twentieth century.) The remainder of Part I—Chapters 5 through 
7—illustrates the scholarly achievements of the Leiden School with extended 
discussions of three important adatrecht doctrines. Chapter 5 summarizes Leiden 
dogma on Southeast Asian attitudes toward crimes or wrongs embodied in the concept 
of "adjustment." Chapter 6 presents Professor Hazairin's defense of the practice of 
jujur marriage among the Rejang of Sumatra, and Chapter 7 addresses the late-colonial 
judicial system and the articulation of adatrecht in the courts.
In Section II Burns first dismantles van Vollenhoven's intellectual edifice and then 
shows that, despite the flaws of adatrecht scholarship, the myth of adat has had 
enduring consequences for the Indonesian state. Chapter 8 begins the dismantling 
project by documenting instances where the fervor of the Leiden School's theoretical 
commitments distorted its scholarly analysis. It is shown, for example, that adat 
doctrines regarding crimes contradict the foundational premise that Asian cultures 
lack a concept of individual culpability. But despite evidence that the facts were being 
forced to fit the theory, the ideology of adat remained essentially unimpaired. Chapter
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9—'The Deep Structure of the Leiden Legacy"—examines the adatrecht phenomenon 
from the perspective of the political and administrative realities of the Dutch colonial 
enterprise. Burns concludes that adatrecht was essentially an exercise of Dutch 
imagination, and that the Leiden School's interpretations of Southeast Asian law and 
culture were responsive to the circumstances of turn-of-the-century European 
colonialism. For one thing, the Dutch, along with other colonial powers, found it 
"necessary to establish among the native peoples ... laws and loyalty other than those 
already claimed and proclaimed by the main contender, international Islam." (212) The 
colonial construction of custom was also shaped by the fact that colonial law had to be 
rendered in a way that made it amenable to use as a tool of administrative regulation 
by a modern state. Adat was transformed into adatrecht, and in the process it was no 
longer adat.
The "legacy" bequeathed by Leiden referred to in Burns's title (The Leiden Legacy) is 
revealed in Chapter 10. It was not van Vollenhoven's intention to promote Indonesian 
nationalism. Indeed, as colonial administrators judged the matter, one of the 
advantages of using adat as the basis for Indies law, rather than either Islam or a 
European-style code, was that the diversity of adat would inhibit development of an 
archipelago-wide political consciousness. It is ironic, therefore, that the most 
significant outcome of the Leiden project was the fostering of Indonesian nationalism.
The title of Chapter 10 is "The European Roots of Indonesian Nationalism." The 
intellectual foundations of adatrecht theory are not Dutch, however, but German. Burns 
traces the methods and core assumptions of adatrecht theory to a nineteenth-century 
jurisprudential movement led by Friederich Karl von Savigny in Germany. The 
movement, known as the Historical School, grew up in reaction against the rationalism 
and universalism that dominated European legal thought following the success of the 
French Civil Code. Von Savigny rejected Enlightenment claims about the possibility for 
grounding law in a timeless universal reason, arguing that the sole source and 
exclusive measure of law is to be found in the life of the community. Because law is the 
spontaneous outgrowth of the lived history of a particular people, the law of each 
nation will be peculiar to that nation.
Van Vollenhoven (and von Savigny before him) was concerned with identifying an 
appropriate grounding for law. But the theory he constructed was obviously both 
jurisprudential theory and a theory about the foundation of nations. Because law is 
distinctive to each community, the boundaries of shared law give definition to the 
community. In their application of this approach to the Indies, the Leideners gave 
implicit endorsement to the idea of Indonesian nationhood. Von Savigny postulated 
the existence of an organic unity of law and community. Van Vollenhoven's research 
on law in the Indies claimed to have discerned a common core of custom across the 
archipelago. The inference from von Savigny's theory and van Vollenhoven's 
ethnography is that the inhabitants of the Indies make up a single nation.
One part of Leiden's legacy to Indonesia was the conceptual framework for 
imagining the nation. That same framework became the basis for a political-legal 
ideology that gave meaning to Indonesian nationalism and served to legitimate the 
rule of repressive regimes in the second half of the twentieth century. Adatrecht theory 
pre-supposes the existence of a body of shared ideas about law, and makes the 
people's subjective judgment regarding the content of those ideas the sole validating
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principle for true law. This approach accords overriding value to consensus, and 
excludes the possibility of disagreement or dissent. This is because the dissenter who 
rejects the ideas that define the community thereby demonstrates that she is not among 
its members. As a result, the state is conceptualized and structured in terms of 
consensus, harmony, and unity. The role of the leader is to discern and realize the 
terms of the consensus in the life of the nation. Individual rights, social conflict, and 
fragmentation of state power are anathema.
The influence of adatrecht thinking is evident both at the founding of the Indonesian 
state and later critical points in the nation's history. The individual who played the 
leading role in transplanting and then cultivating Leiden scholarship in the Indies was 
Supomo. Supomo studied under van Vollenhoven in the Netherlands and served as 
chief justice during the Japanese occupation. He was also chair of the committee that 
drafted the Indonesian constitution. The premises of adatrecht are clearly evident in an 
address by Supomo to a meeting of the preparatory committee for Indonesian 
independence in May 1945. In a portion of the address quoted by Burns, Supomo 
described the Indonesian "national soul, the spiritual constitution of the Indonesian 
people" as characterized by a
... unity of life, unity of slave and lord [kawulo dan gusti], that is to say unity of 
the material world with the unseen internal world, unity between the micro- and 
macrocosm, between the populace and its leaders ...
Given an atmosphere of unity between the folk and their leaders, between 
communal groups one with the other, all are caught up in [diliputi] a spirit of 
mutual assistance [gotong royong], the spirit of the family principle [semangat 
kekeluargaan].
So, Honored Gentlemen, it is clear that, if we are about to set up an Indonesian 
State which is in accord with the distinctive quality and pattern of Indonesian 
society, we must base our state on the mindset [Staatsidee] of an integralistic 
polity, a state which is in unity with the totality of its populace, which is superior 
to the sum of its communal parts [golongan] in any field whatsoever. (247-48)
Burns's objective is to explore the historical roots and foundational assumptions of 
one strain of Indonesian nationalist thought. I do not understand him to be arguing 
that Leiden's romantic idealization of Javanese village life is the sole source of ideas 
about the meaning of Indonesian nationhood and the structure of the Indonesian state. 
Ruth McVey has argued that the central idea that animated the nationalist enterprise 
and still informs thinking about the character and legitimacy of the Indonesian state is 
the idea of achieving modernity.3 The association of modernity with the future and 
with membership in a new political community arose out of a general sense of 
dislocation brought on by rapid social, political, and technological change during the 
first decades of the twentieth century. Because they were identified with the future, 
modernity and Indonesian nationalism came to be defined in terms of a conception of 
the past. In McVey's interpretation, the core meaning of Indonesian nationalism is 
kemerdekaan—freedom or liberation. The modern Indonesian future was understood as
3 Ruth McVey, "Building Behemoth: Indonesian Constructions of the Nation-State," in Making 
Indonesia: Essays on Modern Indonesia in Honor of George McT. Kahin, ed. Daniel S. Lev and Ruth 
McVey (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program, Studies on Southeast Asia, 1996), pp. 11-25.
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liberation from both Dutch rule and also from the constraints of indigenous social and 
cultural hierarchies.
The merdeka strand of Indonesian nationalism never found its Supomo and was 
never explicitly formulated as political-legal theory. As McVey shows, however, the 
association of Indonesianness with modernity, progress, and prosperity has 
nevertheless played a legitimating role in the independent republic. It is significant, 
moreover, that Supomo's was not the only political-legal ideology represented in the 
constitutional debates at the founding of the state. David Bourchier, who has 
researched many of the same issues addressed by Burns,4 has shown that the positivist 
legal tradition that informed the thinking of Dutch advocates for codification was also 
represented among Indonesian nationalists who drafted the constitution. It is also 
noteworthy that the 1945 constitution that embodied Supomo's vision of an 
authoritarian "integralist" Indonesian state was discarded (albeit only temporarily) as 
soon as Indonesia achieved full sovereignty in 1949.5 For much of the following 
decade, the Indonesian political and legal system was characterized by aggressive 
party politics, separation of governmental power, and recognition of the need for legal 
restraints on state power. The reality of 1950s Indonesia, in short, was a flat 
contradiction of Supomo's image of harmonious organic unity as the sole authentic 
expression of the Indonesian national character.
During periods of political openness, the political-legal tradition passed down to 
Indonesia from Leiden has competed for influence with other philosophies. Supomo's 
integralism, however, has been the undisputed ideology of choice for Indonesian 
dictators, and has proven to be a versatile vehicle for despots from both the left and the 
right. Sukarno relied on a version of Supomo's ideas in support of his left-leaning 
Guided Democracy. His successor, Suharto, perceived no contradiction in invoking a 
variation of the same tradition as justification for his authoritarian right-wing Pancasila 
Democracy. For me, the greatest value of Burns's book is that he gets inside these 
otherwise baffling claims. He shows, for example, that the New Order doctrine that 
"Pancasila is the source of all sources of law," however cynical, has its own internal 
logic.
Indonesian Reformasi as Reflected in Law
Petra Stockmann's book could be described as an inquiry into the fate of adatrecht 
political-legal ideology post-Suharto. Stockmann seeks to assess how far integralist 
thinking survived the New Order through an examination of legislation enacted
4 See David Bourchier, "Positivism and Romanticism in Indonesian Legal Thought," in 
Indonesia: Lazo and Society, ed. Tim Lindsey (Annandale, Australia: Federation Press, 1999), 
p p .186-96.
5 Indonesia has had three constitutions in the sixty years since independence. Under pressure 
from the Dutch, a federal structure was created in a constitution promulgated in 1949. A 
provisional constitution establishing a parliamentary system was instituted in 1950, pending 
resolution of negotiations over a permanent constitution in the constitutional assembly or 
Konstituante. Sukarno reinstated the 1945 constitution in 1959 when he disbanded the 
Konstituante and declared Guided Democracy.
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during the first few years after the regime's collapse.6 The time frame covered in the 
study begins with the resignation of Suharto in May 1998 and runs through the MPR 
session of August 2000. This period encompasses the first two rounds of constitutional 
amendments and the passage of major new laws on elections, political parties, and 
human rights. Developments between August 2000 and November 2003 are treated in 
a brief Epilogue.
The study focuses on the content of positive legislation. The debates that preceded 
the enactment of new laws and the organization and operation of institutional 
mechanisms for enforcement of the law receive only passing consideration. As 
Stockmann explains, this approach is based on an assumption that legislation passed 
during a period of political transition "mirrors the power struggle of the political 
elite(s)" and reveals the way decision makers have acted upon their perceptions of 
domestic and international pressures and influences. (14—15)
Stockmann defines two frames of reference for evaluating the significance of the 
new legislation. The first, "internal" standard has two aspects. First, the post-Suharto 
enactments are examined against pre-1998 laws on the same subject. Here the aim is 
simply to determine how far the law has actually changed. Second, Stockmann 
analyzes Reformasi-era laws for evidence of ideological continuity with the New Order. 
For this purpose he defines what he calls the New Order "dominant discourse." This 
concept, explained more fully below, includes the regime's "main ideological support 
pillars and its main legitimization devices." (14)
Stockmann finds an external standard for assessing the significance of Reformasi-era 
legislation in the ideal of the rule of law. For purposes of the study, Stockmann 
conceptualizes the rule of law as a political-legal system in which, at a minimum, the 
human rights standards contained in international law are adhered to. In answer to the 
objection that this involves measuring Indonesian actions against standards that 
Indonesia has not embraced, Stockmann points to the recognition of the concept of the 
rechtstaat, or "law state," in the Indonesian constitution.
Chapter two is entitled "New Order Dominant Discourse and its Manifestation in 
Legislation." Stockmann begins by defining two "mutually exclusive" concepts of the 
state that informed the thinking of the drafters of the 1945 constitution and have 
competed for dominance ever since. On one side of the constitutional debate was 
Supomo's integralistik staatsidee. Stockmann explains Supomo's vision in line with 
Burns's analysis as representing an application of the methodological assumptions of 
the German Historical School to Indonesian adat. The other state concept put forward 
during the drafting of the constitution was that of the rechtstaat. The key features of the 
rechtstaat model, championed during the constitutional debates by Muhammad Yamin 
and Muhammad Hatta, include separation of powers, accountability of the executive 
and legislature in a parliamentary system, the power of judicial review, a 
constitutionally protected bill of rights, and a unified European-style legal system.
Integralist principles outweighed rechtstaat ideals in the New Order dominant 
discourse. Other elements included in the discourse are anti-communism, an emphasis 
on national unity and integrity, developmentalism, formal recognition of the military's
6 Stockmann limits his examination of changes in the political system to institutional arrangements at 
the national level. The entire issue of decentralization is excluded from the analysis.
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role in social life under the doctrine of dwi-fungsi, and essentially unlimited state power 
through elevation of Pancasila to the status of supreme source of all law. In the rest of 
Chapter 2, Stockmann summarizes manifestations of New Order dominant discourse 
in Suharto-era laws on the political system and human rights. This includes a 
description of the constitutional provisions on the structure of the state and human 
rights and a review of legislation on, among other things, political parties, the 
judiciary, the internal security organizations (KOPKAMTIB, Komando Pemulihan 
Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and 
Order, and, later, BAKORSTANAS, Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas 
Nasional, Coordinating Agency for National Security), industrial relations, and the 
press. The picture that emerges is one of repression and Gleichschaltung or "forcing into 
line." Stockmann discerns a characteristic pattern of giving overt endorsement to 
rechtstaat ideals—unequivocal statements of basic rights, for example—and then covert 
subversion of those ideals in the same or related enactments. The Suharto-era Press 
Law, for instance, guaranteed "freedom of the press in accordance with fundamental 
citizens' rights" and unambiguously banned censorship. The transitional provision of 
the Press Law, however, preserved the requirement of a government publication 
license (Surat Izin Terbit, SIT) and thereby ensured the government's ability to silence 
speech with which it disagreed. A subsequent amendment abolished the SIT only to 
replace it with an equally effective censorship mechanism in the form of a requirement 
for a Press Publication Enterprise License (Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers, SIUPP).
After a summary of significant political developments in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 
analyzes Reformasi-era enactments relating to the political system. The five principal 
topics addressed in the chapter are: the law on political parties; the election law; the 
composition, rights, and functions of the MPR and DPR; the powers of the executive; 
and the judicial system and law enforcement. The approach followed with respect to 
each subject is to examine all recent changes contained in MPR Decrees, constitutional 
amendments, and legislation, followed by an assessment of the extent of continuity or 
change reflected in those enactments.
Stockmann finds that the pattern identified during the New Order period of giving 
legislative lip service to rechtstaat ideals and then simultaneously qualifying or 
undermining those ideals is also evident in Reformasi-e ra legislation. Stockmann's 
analysis of the 1999 Election Law is illustrative. On the positive side, the law abolishes 
the New Order restriction that limited the number of political parties to three. The law 
also includes a variety of mechanisms designed to ensure that elections are fair and 
transparent, though these mechanisms are not entirely adequate. The significance of 
these changes is qualified by the fact that the law "includes numerous carryover 
provisions [from the prior law that] infringe upon the principles of a democratic 
rechtstaat in the same manner if not degree as under the New Order." (142) In support 
of this statement, Stockmann cites, inter alia, the prohibition of local or regional 
political parties, disqualification of parties that failed to achieve a minimal level of 
support in the 1999 elections, wide disparities in the ratio of elected representatives to 
population among the various provinces, overcompensation of disenfranchisement of 
the military and the police with the reservation of thirty-eight MPR seats, 
disqualification from candidacy for public office of individuals considered to have 
been affiliated with communist or other banned organizations, limitations on political 
speech, and the weaknesses in the sanctions and enforcement machinery of the law.
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Stockmann's assessment of human rights legislation in Chapter 5 is similar to his 
assessment of reforms to the political system. One of the issues addressed in Chapter 5 
will be discussed below. In general, Stockmann shows that, in the process of 
enactment, many of the rights contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the 1998 Human Rights Action Plan, which served as sources for legislation, were 
omitted, qualified, or watered down.
Chapter 6 summarizes the conclusions of the study. Stockmann's judgment of the 
early years of reform is generally negative. In answer to the question whether 
constitutional reforms altered the balance between integralism and rechtstaat, 
Stockmann concludes that the changes contained in the first two amendments failed to 
bring about "the much needed systematic overhaul of the Indonesian political system." 
(320) In support of this conclusion, Stockmann cites the failure to establish Regional 
Representative Councils, provide for direct election of the president, and create a 
Constitutional Court. It is acknowledged that the first two constitutional amendments 
effected a number of changes supportive of the development of a democratic rechtstaat. 
The second amendment, for example, imposes a requirement that the membership of 
the DPR be elected, thereby terminating the practice of padding the assembly with 
appointed members. With respect to the MPR, however, elimination of appointed seats 
for the military and police was postponed until 2009. The judgment on non­
constitutional legislation on the political system and human rights laws is similar. 
Stockmann also finds that most of the elements of New Order dominant discourse 
survive. Anti-communism, Pancasila, commitment to national unity, and the dual 
function of the military all persist. The only plank of the discourse no longer in 
evidence is developmentalism.
In the Epilogue, Stockmann considers whether developments through November 
2003 affect his earlier assessment of the chances for the emergence of democracy and 
legality. After reviewing the third and fourth constitutional amendments and several 
pieces of new legislation, Stockmann gives his assessment that the prospects for 
democracy, rechtstaat, and human rights protection had deteriorated between late 2000 
and November 2003. Although the third and fourth amendments had put in place the 
key structural reforms that Stockmann found missing at the end of 2000, he found 
indications in non-constitutional legislation of backtracking on reforms and 
strengthening of Suharto-era ideology. A number of legislative changes are cited in 
support of this conclusion, but Stockmann singles out the enactment of the anti­
terrorism law following the 2002 Bali bombing as the most serious setback.
Stockmann's analysis is careful, thorough, and well informed. His close 
examination of the details of recent legislation and his comparison of the terms of all 
recent enactments bearing on a particular subject clearly reveal the influence of the 
opponents of an open and transparent political process. That said, I do not believe that 
Stockmann's evaluation of five years of legislation provides an adequate basis for his 
ambitious conclusions. The problems resulting from the narrow and arbitrary time 
frame of the study (dictated, apparently, by the fact that the research was conducted 
for his doctoral dissertation) are only partially remedied by the update provided in the 
Epilogue. The more fundamental problem, however, is that positive law is too 
uncertain a measure of the institutional and structural determinants of legal and 
political development to serve as an accurate indicator of future change.
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Stockmann uses legislation as his primary source, but he makes clear that his 
interest is not in law per se. Though not denying the importance of law to the process of 
reform, his analysis of legislation is not intended to reveal what the law is. As 
Stockmann obviously understands, any meaningful analysis of the actual state of legal 
protection for human rights would at least require consideration of the institutional 
structures for asserting, interpreting, and enforcing legislative norms regarding those 
rights. Stockmann's own analysis clearly shows that the "law" understood in terms of 
what the state will actually enforce is much more complicated than the terms of 
statutes and constitutions.
In Stockmann's analysis, legislation is not the object of inquiry, but is used instead 
as evidence of the relative influence of pro- and antireform elements at the time the 
legislation was enacted. This strikes me as unobjectionable from a purely 
methodological perspective. The question, though, is whether this snapshot of the 
terms of "the elite compromise at a given point in time" (14) appreciably advances our 
understanding of the progress of legal and political reform. It certainly seems 
reasonable to look to the intentions of those in power for evidence of the future 
direction of government change. Missing from Stockmann's analysis, however, is any 
explanation for why outcomes within the legislative process should be deemed 
decisive. Focusing on the legislature cannot be justified on the basis that legislators 
control the reins of power through their ability to control the law, since there is much 
more to law than the language of legislation. Nor can it be said that the results of 
legislative battles on politics and human rights indicate that the balance of power in 
general is weighted against change. Stockmann's demonstration of the continuing 
influence of opponents of reform in the legislative process provides a valuable window 
into ongoing battles over the future direction of political development in Indonesia. 
However, his inquiry takes in too narrow a segment of the political-legal landscape to 
support definitive judgments about the results of those struggles.
My misgivings with Stockmann's approach can be illustrated by taking a closer 
look at one of his examples. At several points in his study, Stockmann discusses the 
treatment in Indonesian law of the prohibition against prosecution under a retroactive 
criminal statute. As with other enactments on human rights, the MPR drew on the 
language of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to draft its rule on 
nonretroactivity. Because of events occurring concurrently with the drafting of the 
second amendment, the precise formulation of the nonretroactivity principle assumed 
particular importance.
The second constitutional amendment was debated and approved in August 2000. 
At the same time that the MPR was considering the second amendment (which 
included the ex post facto ban), the DPR was debating a bill specifically authorizing 
retrospective prosecutions. The retroactive criminal statute before the DPR was 
contained in a proposal to create a human rights court. The proposal, which authorized 
prosecution for crimes committed during the 1999 independence referendum in East 
Timor, was in direct response to a threat from the United Nations Security Council that 
if Indonesia failed to prosecute the perpetrators of the East Timor crimes an 
international tribunal would be established for that purpose.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights's provision on retroactive criminal 
statutes prohibits prosecution for "any act or omission which did not constitute a penal
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offense, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed" 
(emphasis added). Adoption of this language by the MPR would have presented no 
bar to prosecution of the East Timor crimes since the penal provisions of the Human 
Rights Court Statute define as crimes those recognized in international law. The MPR 
chose not to use the language of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, however, 
and the prohibition against retroactive penal laws is framed in seemingly absolute 
terms. Article 281 of the amended constitution includes the right against retrospective 
prosecutions with other nonderogable rights that "may not be interfered with under 
any circumstances."
The scenario thus far fits Stockmann's predictions to the letter. Investigations of the 
violence in East Timor placed principal responsibility for human rights abuses on the 
Indonesian armed forces. It was the armed forces that stood to benefit from the 
protection afforded against retroactive-prosecution statutes, and Stockmann is 
certainly justified in his suspicion that the MPR's generous definition of the right 
against ex post facto criminal laws was intended to shield the military from 
accountability.
Prosecutions were initiated under the Human Rights Court Law for human rights 
abuses committed in East Timor, and a number of military and police officials were 
found guilty of crimes against humanity. One of the convicted defendants appealed to 
the newly established Constitutional Court, claiming that his conviction violated the 
prohibition against retroactive prosecutions.
The legal posture of the case before the Constitutional Court fit a pattern common 
in constitutional adjudication. The arguments on one side emphasized the plain 
meaning of the constitutional text that appears to bar retrospective prosecutions 
without exception. Arguments on the other side focused on the general purpose of the 
ex post facto prohibition, which is to prevent punishment for acts that were not criminal 
at the time they were committed, rather than on the specific formulation of the rule in 
Indonesian law. Since the crimes for which the defendant was convicted have been 
recognized internationally for more than half a century, according to this approach, his 
trial and conviction did not violate any constitutionally protected right. By a six to 
three majority the Constitutional Court rejected the defendant's appeal and upheld the 
conviction. Though the decision is not a model of legal prose, the result is amply 
supported by legal reasoning that would be recognizable to any lawyer familiar with 
international criminal law. It is also significant that the same court reached the 
opposite result in a second case involving the same provision of the constitution. This 
case arose out of the prosecution of an individual accused of participating in the 
October 2002 bombings of two Bali nightclubs. The crimes for which the defendant was 
convicted were contained in an antiterrorism law that was enacted after the Bali 
bombings and made retroactively applicable to the bombings. In deciding that the 
prosecution violated the ex post facto prohibition, the Court relied on, among other 
things, the fact that there is no generally recognized definition of the crime of 
terrorism.
The Constitutional Court is not typical of the Indonesian judiciary generally. In its 
three years of operation, the court has established a record of independence and
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principled decision making.7 Independence and principled decision making do not 
characterize the rest of the Indonesian judiciary, however. Burdened by decades of 
corruption and domination by the executive, the courts have proven especially 
resistant to reform.8 The current chief justice, Bagir Manan, is both capable and 
committed, but transformation of the courts will be a long process.
It may be wishful thinking, but I believe that Stockmann's assessment of the 
progress and prospects of legal and political reform in Indonesia is overly pessimistic. 
What is certain, though, is that the goals of protecting human rights and establishing 
accountable government will be achieved, if at all, not by passing laws or filling the 
ranks of the legislature with reformers (though some of both is obviously necessary) 
but in the creation of institutions that subject the exercise of state power to the 
constraints of law and principle.
7 The court's most celebrated decision invalidated a provision of the 2003 election law that barred former 
communists and other presumed enemies of the state from candidacy for public office. In another 
important decision, the court struck down a portion of its own enabling legislation that imposed limits on 
the court's judicial review powers on the ground that the limitation contained in the statute conflicted 
with the powers granted to the court in the constitution.
8 Sebastiaan Pompe, The Indonesian Supreme Court: A Study of Institutional Collapse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
Southeast Asia Program, 2005).
